

Executive Registry
76-7876/A

May 12, 1976

Dear Mr. Tennant,

Thanks so much for your letter of May 3rd.  
The Walter Parks are indeed great friends of ours  
from Midland.

I appreciate your invitation to appear on  
the David Brudnoy Show and will be glad to do it  
sometime in the future. Please contact my  
Executive Assistant, [redacted]  
to set up a firm date and time. She can be  
reached at [redacted]

Again, thank you for writing,

Sincerely,

[redacted]

George Bush

STATINTL

Mr. Robert W. Tennant  
Producer  
The David Brudnoy Show  
WHDH Radio  
441 Stuart Street  
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

kgt/12 May 1976

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - A/DCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DCI w/basic

Executive Registry  
Room 7-E-12  
Headquarters

(RECEIVED BOSTON FIELD) *Park*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

JF

send nice note

"the Water Parks  
are indeed great  
friends of ours  
from Midland"

STATINTL

I will do it  
some time - Please  
call   
to set it up etc.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI		
2	J.F.		
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

## Remarks:

J.F. Here's the  
10 pm one. It's 10  
minutes with no  
outside phone calls -- see  
p. 2.

STATINTEL

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FORM NO.  
1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/IC				
9	D/DCI/NIO				
10	GC				
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI	✓			
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

*For you call.*




3637 (1-73)

Date

# WHDH

RADIO 85

FOUR FORTY-ONE STUART STREET  
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02116  
TELEPHONE (617) 247-0850



May 3, 1976

TENNANT, Robt

Director George Bush  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Director Bush:

As producer of the David Brudnoy show and a nephew of Dr. & Mrs. Walter S. Parks, Jr. of Middleland, Texas, I would like to extend to you an invitation to appear on the David Brudnoy show which can be heard over WHDH Radio (850am, 50,000 watts) here in Boston.

Recently, my aunt, Mrs. Walter S. Parks, Jr., was visiting my family in Massachusetts and mentioned that she and my uncle know the Bush family of Middleland, Texas. My aunt, although reluctant because she does not like to take advantage of personal relationships, said I could use her name in trying to reach you to be a guest on the David Brudnoy show.

ATTN:TE David Brudnoy, who you may or may not know, is a writer for Nation Review Magazine and is a close personal friend of William F. Buckley, Jr. He is a libertarian conservative who believes in the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency as an important element in the defense of the United States. In other words, you would be dealing with a friendly interviewer who supports the CIA.


Personally, I had the pleasure of meeting you when you were Chairman of the National Republican Committee and spoke at our Annual Lincoln Day Dinner in Newton, Massachusetts. I understand from my aunt that since you have become Director of the CIA that you cannot answer any political questions. Mr. Brudnoy will confine his questions to the role and operation of the CIA and will remain as a-political as possible.

The David Brudnoy show is broadcast live, Monday-Friday, 10pm to Midnight EST. Since your schedule and commitments must be extremely burdensome in your role as director, I would like to make a conference call hookup. With a conference line, I can

call you anywhere on the North American Continent when your schedule permits during our two hour segment on the air. The interview will be brief. All I'm asking is ten minutes of your time and I would not expect you to take any local phone calls.

I will call your Washington office in a couple of days to see when this can be arranged.

Best regards,



Robert W. Tennant/Producer  
THE DAVID BRUDNOY SHOW

RWT:j

12 MAY 1976

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry

76-2216

STATINTEL



1 what was  
Gregory Rushford  
like?

2 age —

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

*Pub. Office*

Executive Registry  
Room 7-E-12  
Headquarters



# Our Passive, Timid CIA Needs Leadership

By Gregory G. Rushford

**T**HE CLASSIC intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor, when U.S. intercepts of the Japanese attack plans remained untranslated in a low-priority "incoming" basket, sparked the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War II. Because the Japanese attack hinged on complete surprise, an intelligence warning would have made a difference. That knowledge remains the driving force behind the billions devoted to foreign analysis by the CIA and its sister agencies in the Defense and State departments.

Despite the billions spent, the United States has been caught unprepared time and time again because—there is no kinder way to put it—our intelligence has failed. Even if we assume the CIA would be able to detect a nuclear attack on the United States in advance, which I do not, continued failures to anticipate important foreign developments make the conduct of a sound foreign policy increasingly difficult. To ignore our intelligence system's flaws—continuing flaws that stem from an uncertain leadership—is to risk our very security.

To examine the record, the House Intelligence Committee selected six major foreign-policy turning points at random: the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1973 Middle East war, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and Portugal, and India's 1974 nuclear explosion. (Because the House has voted not to release the committee's findings, this article is derived from the public record.)

## Intelligence Failures

We knew that Czechoslovakia had dashed the Johnson Administration's hopes for nuclear-arms talks with the Russians; that Tet cost thousands of lives; that the Middle East war resulted in the Arab oil embargo, a high cost to the U.S. in terms of military assistance to Israel, and risked U.S.-Soviet conflict. We knew that the coups in Portugal and Cyprus had raised the possibility of Communist influence in a NATO ally and hurt our relationships with Greece and Turkey. We knew that India's nuclear explosion threatened the spread of nuclear weapons.

We did not know intelligence failures had contributed to each unfortunate situation. But we know it now.

U.S. intelligence agencies, we found, had collected a considerable body of excellent information, often at great cost and risk. But the information was not always made available to those who needed it. Written estimates lacked perspective. A few courageous analysts who sounded alarms were not fully supported by their more cautious superiors. Technical breakdowns prevented valuable information from reaching Washington until after the event had passed. Policy officials in the State Department, the White House, and Pentagon who were emotionally com-

mitted to their particular policies, regardless of facts, hindered analysis. Post mortems of intelligence failures tended to blame mid-level analysts, yet the real problems were caused by the leadership. And the intelligence leadership lacks the stature to withstand political pressures that threaten to corrupt the entire system.

After the 1973 Middle East intelligence failure, the CIA acknowledged that the "machinery" of which the analyst was a part had not always eased an exceedingly difficult task. The two most visible parts of that machinery, or bureaucracy, are current-intelligence publications and national intelligence estimates. Neither runs well.

Our intelligence agencies cannot report timely and accurate information consistently. The initial and most obvious sign shows up in what the current-intelligence publications said at the time of key foreign events. The morning that Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus was overthrown by Greek strong man Dimitrios Ioannidis, the CIA wrote that "General Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing for time in dispute with Makarios."

The intelligence agencies had observed signs of Arab military mobilization for more than a week prior to Oct. 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. But current-intelligence reporting provided reassurances that neither Egypt nor Syria would go to war.

In the months prior to the April 1974 coup in Portugal, at least four signs of serious political discontent—including an abortive military coup—surfaced in the press. Yet current-intelligence writings followed the sound and fury, not significance, of each "hard news" development. As the director of State Department intelligence, William Hyland, told our committee, "There was enough information to suggest trouble, but it wasn't really subjected to a detailed analysis and a projection of where the trends might be going."

## Too Many Pressures

Current-intelligence publications suffer from lack of depth not because those who write them are unimpressive. Most mid-level analysts who write current intelligence are knowledgeable individuals. But they are victimized by the pressures imposed on able people by the bureaucracy.

There are too many intelligence publications: spot reports, instant summaries, daily reports, morning and afternoon reports for the Secretary of State, Presidential briefs, memoranda, communications-intelligence summaries, national-intelligence dailies, weekly summaries. Analysts have meetings to attend, superiors to please (often by softening bold judgments), "positions" of their office to "co-ordinate" with other offices and agencies, deadlines to meet. There is precious little time left to think and write well.

Those who read current intelligence often complain about its redundancy, duplication, and poor analysis. During Cyprus alone there were 86 messages classified "CRITIC," or critically important, yet "the significance of many . . . was obscure," the CIA found.

The National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepts and decodes foreign communications, produces raw reports that are nearly incomprehensible to the lay reader; the written summaries are understandable

to few. The NSA collects so much data that it must shred or burn more than 30 tons of paper each day; it is literally burying itself in classified information. NSA spews forth so much data that the analyst is burdened with hundreds of NSA reports per week, the CIA complains. During the Cyprus crisis, readers complained about "an excess of cryptic raw reports from NSA which could not be translated by lay readers," as the CIA puts it. The few who can comprehend NSA reports often have no time left to compare them with other intelligence. So intelligence puzzles are left half-assembled.

U.S. intelligence cannot follow trends much better than it follows day-to-day events because of weaknesses in the estimative system. Before Tet, U.S. officials had anticipated attacks in Vietnam's highlands and northernmost provinces, but not simultaneous strikes at nearly every urban center. Our intelligence estimates had—in the CIA's words—so "degraded our image of the enemy" that we were unaware the Communists were capable of such attacks.

The CIA's post mortem of the 1974 Cyprus crisis reports that analytical performance "fell quite short of the mark," particularly because of the "failure in July to estimate the likelihood of a Greek-sponsored coup against Archbishop Makarios."

After the Middle East war in October 1973, the CIA realized there had been no National Intelligence Estimate—report prepared from time to time—on the likelihood of war since May—and that estimate had only addressed the next few weeks. A brilliant analysis prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, also in May, told then Secretary of State William Rogers that the Arabs might well resort to war by autumn. That "wisdom," as the CIA rightly called it, was forgotten in October.

The latest National Intelligence Estimate prior to Portugal's 1974 coup was prepared in 1964.

The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system at the top of the analytical hierarchy is weak and is responsible for the poor quality of estimates preceding the Portugal, Cyprus, and Middle East crises. NIOs work under the director of the CIA, in his capacity as head of the entire intelligence community. Their influence varies with the CIA director's influence. If he's powerful, their voice is strong. If he's weak, their influence is too.



The NIO for Western Europe, a capable man, has more than 20 countries to cover. But he has just one staff assistant. Instead of command authority over the time of analysts in the CIA and other agencies, the NIO must "cajole and plead" for assistance, as one close observer told me. When Turkey was preparing to invade Cyprus, an NIO memorandum that predicted the invasion was never disseminated: The NIO was busy preparing a briefing before the U.S. Intelligence Board on a National Intelligence Estimate for Italy.

Most NIOs have regional responsibilities, yet some crucial issues, such as nuclear proliferation, cannot be covered in regional terms. There has been no NIO for Africa.

The value of the NIO system is considerable to busy policy officials who need quick answers, say before a Kissinger shuttle to the Middle East. But the very closeness of NIOs to policy makes the system vulnerable to pressures that can destroy the independence of their analyses. This is a far cry from the expectations of some of its founders that the CIA would provide independent analysis of long-term trends.

When the Germans began losing World War II, Hitler began disregarding accurate intelligence evaluations that conflicted with the Nazi line. This lesson (fortunately for us) is worth remembering always, especially when thinking of the Vietnam War.

### Doubt Becomes Heresy

Just as Vietnam tore our society, it caused great pressures inside U.S. intelligence agencies. The basic problem was accurate intelligence that cast doubt on the wisdom of Vietnam policy. That doubt became heresy when the policy stakes rose.

The first National Intelligence Estimate that I'm positive was "shaded" to reflect policy officials' optimism was published in early 1963. That estimate was first weakened during the drafting process to reflect the Kennedy Administration's hopeful views. The draft estimate had forecast long-range problems with our South Vietnamese allies without increased U.S. support. Instead of heeding such sound advice, the Administration influenced the CIA to weaken it.

The CIA uncovered evidence in 1966 and 1967 indicating the U.S. military command had understated Communist strength, that there probably were more than 500,000 enemy personnel, not the prevailing—and public—estimate of fewer than 300,000.

The CIA's efforts to provide honest intelligence ran directly into the overriding public-relations concerns of military and civilian policy makers. Like used-car salesmen, military officials tried strenuously to set the mileage back. If the higher figures became known to those who had an "incorrect view" of the war, the Saigon command cabled to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command's "image of success" would be undermined.

The military fought so fiercely with the

CIA's figures in Saigon in September 1967 that two categories of irregular Communist forces were dropped from the official order of battle. Immediately thereafter the Saigon command prepared press briefings on the war's progress that one CIA official labeled "one of the greatest snow jobs since Potemkin constructed his village." Another CIA analyst termed the military numbers "contrived," "phony," and "controlled by the desire to stay below" the 300,000 public estimate.

After the Tet offensive began, the Defense Intelligence Agency agreed there were at least 500,000 Communist forces in Vietnam, and the Joint Chiefs asked for more American soldiers to fight them.

### A Rancorous Debate

A good example of policy abuse of intelligence in the State Department is shown in a memorandum State Intelligence was asked to send to Assistant Secretary William Bundy in September 1967. "Unclassified" findings that could be made public said enemy morale and recruitment were declining and Viet Cong defections were increasing. But facts directly contradicting each of these points, and more, were classified secret on "national security" grounds: Enemy morale problems were of no great military import; defections were increasing less than in the previous year; and enemy recruitment statistics were unreliable.

American intelligence still suffers because officials who could not hide their disgust at such tactics found their careers threatened. Those who kept quiet were promoted.

By 1973 the Vietnam debate had be-

come so rancorous it helped destroy the respected Board of National Estimates. The board, an interagency body of intelligence experts responsible for estimates, had become moribund in the eyes of some. Moribund or not, the board fought for the integrity of its Vietnam estimates to the bitter end. Three persons close to the board have told me they knew the battles were nearly finished when one of President Nixon's favorite press leaks wrote that it was unlikely Nixon's sharp eye had escaped the "gloomy" CIA estimates on Vietnam and that changes in the estimative hierarchy were needed. Shortly thereafter a new CIA director—a Nixon "team player" and a Vietnam-policy supporter—abolished the board for the weaker NIO system.

### Kissinger Is Criticized

The lesson of Pearl Harbor has not been absorbed by the CIA leadership. The "watch committee" that met to assess the outbreak of war in the Middle East on Oct. 6, 1973—after hostilities had begun—could not discuss certain classified information because not everyone present was cleared to receive it. Other classified information that would have been helpful to analysis was not disseminated until the war had begun. Similar problems plagued the Cyprus and other crises.

The lack of dissemination of intelligence controlled by Secretary of State Kissinger is disturbing because it reveals the CIA leadership's lack of stature. High intelligence and policy officials recognize the intelligence value in diplomatic discussions. To study the nuances of these conversations for their hidden meanings, and to compare this information with other findings, is essential for accurate intelligence.

Prior to the 1973 Middle East war,

**continued**

Kissinger was engaged in intensive discussions with Soviet, Arab, and Israeli officials. According to *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* by Israeli journalist Matti Golan, Kissinger later told Israeli Premier Golda Meir that an Egyptian official had hinted at possible war, but he dismissed this as an empty threat. U.S. intelligence was denied access to the discussions which might have assisted analysis.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—a notable intelligence success—President Kennedy and his staff worked intimately with senior intelligence officials. Yet Secretary Kissinger did not even consult his intelligence arm in the State Department prior to the U.S. troop alert of Oct. 24, 1973, which allegedly came in response to Soviet threats to intervene with military force against Israel. Testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that "certainly the technical intelligence available in INR [State Department intelligence] did not support such a Soviet intention" raises the question: Did the United States risk war without justification?

#### Embarrassed Officials

The CIA complained after the Cyprus crisis that "analysis . . . may also have suffered as the result of the nonavailability of certain key categories of information, specifically those associated with private conversations between U.S. policy makers and certain principals in the dispute." The CIA added: "Because ignorance of such matters could substantially damage the ability to analyze events as they unfold, in this or in any future crisis, the problem is serious and one which should be addressed by the [intelligence] community and by policy makers as well."

Yet CIA officials were so embar-

rassed when I asked them which policy makers they had in mind that the name of one of Kissinger's principal aides was excised from the House Intelligence Committee copy of the Cyprus post mortem. The phrase "key U.S. official" was typed in its place. Such information is still "nonavailable" to the CIA on such important issues as U.S.-China relations.

#### Third-Level Assistant

In 1973 some intelligence officials were greatly concerned that Kissinger might be suppressing intelligence related to alleged Soviet violations of the SALT agreement. Two of them recommended that acting CIA Director Vernon Walters (who has announced he plans to retire soon) approach the President to ensure that Kissinger's conduct was authorized. Walters, following the pattern he established when Nixon's aides had tried to abuse the CIA in the Watergate affair, never approached the President. CIA Director Colby later got in the habit of writing to Kissinger's aides for permission to disseminate certain intelligence concerning Soviet nuclear-arms matters. Thus the President's statutory intelligence adviser was reduced to a third-level assistant. Kissinger aides justify this by citing numerous leaks that seemed designed to undercut SALT policy.

Such timidity does not encourage one to believe the CIA is equipped to resist the inevitable encroachments from dominating Presidential assistants. The CIA has become not the "rogue elephant" some fear, but a passive circus pony, ridden at will by Presidential assistants. Newly appointed CIA Director George Bush would be well-advised to attract new leadership.

*Gregory G. Rushford was an investigator for the House Intelligence Committee in its recent investigation of the CIA.*

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Review Staff, <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 35-8 (47)  
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED  
Release 2006/11/11 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700070000